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TAKING STOCK OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES 
JOHN INAZU* 
INTRODUCTION 
After a few decades of relative quiet, the Supreme Court has in recent 
years focused once again on the religion clauses and related statutes. 
Beginning with its unanimous opinion recognizing the ministerial exception 
in Hosanna-Tabor v. EEOC (2012), the Court has issued a series of high-
profile decisions: Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby (2014), Holt v. Hobbs (2015), Trinity Lutheran v. Comer (2017), 
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission (2018), Trump 
v. Hawaii (2018), and just last term, American Legion v. American 
Humanist Association (2019).1 This term (after the articles for this 
symposium had been written), the Court decided three cases involving 
religion: one striking down a no-aid provision relating to the use of tax 
credits for religious schools,2 one clarifying the scope of the ministerial 
exception,3 and one holding that the federal government lawfully exempted 
 
* Sally D. Danforth Distinguished Professor of Law and Religion, Washington University in 
St. Louis. Thanks to Alex Siemers and Johanna Christophel for research assistance. 
1. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171 (2012); Town 
of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014); Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682 (2014); 
Holt v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 (2015); Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 
2012 (2017); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018); Trump 
v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019).  
2. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 18-1195, 2020 WL 3518364 (U.S. June 30, 
2020). 
3. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, No. 19-267, 2020 WL 3808420 (U.S. 
July 8, 2020). 











religious objectors from the regulatory requirement to provide health plans 
that include contraceptive coverage.4  
A number of recent cases formally resolved under free speech doctrine 
also touch on important dimensions of religious freedom and religious 
expression: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum (2009), Christian Legal 
Society v. Martinez (2010), McCullen v. Coakley (2014), and Reed v. Town 
of Gilbert (2015).5 And, in its next term, the Court will hear a case at the 
intersection of religious freedom and gay rights that could reshape its 
approach to free exercise claims over the past thirty years.6 
Changes in our understanding of law and religion also extend beyond 
legal doctrine.7 The past few years have seen significant demographic and 
political shifts. For the first time in American history, nonbelievers and 
religiously unaffiliated citizens comprise a significant demographic of the 
country’s population,8 which has emerged alongside a declining Protestant 
influence on white middle-class culture.9 The role of American Muslims has 
taken on increased visibility.10 Voters are sorting themselves relationally, 
informationally, and even geographically.11 And growing divides over the 
 
4. See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, No. 19-431, 2020 
WL 3808424 (U.S. July 8, 2020). This is the culmination of litigation that previously reached the 
Supreme Court a few years ago. See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (per curiam) (vacating 
and remanding consolidated cases due to supplemental briefing indicating that contraceptive coverage 
could be provided through insurance companies without notice to the religious employers). 
5. Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009); Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the 
Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661 (2010); McCullen v. Coakley, 573 
U.S. 464 (2014); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015). 
6. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 922 F.3d 140 (3d. Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 
1104 (2020) (No. 19-123). The second question presented asks whether the Court should revisit the free 
exercise framework set out in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). Smith concluded that 
claims brought under the Free Exercise Clause warranted no heightened constitutional scrutiny when 
they challenged neutral and generally applicable laws and regulations. Id. at 885. 
7. For an important assessment of how changes in law and religion jurisprudence may be more 
culturally than legally driven, see Paul Horwitz, The Hobby Lobby Moment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
154 (2014). Horwitz suggests that “[t]he important arguments in moments of deep social and legal 
contestation—including the Hobby Lobby moment—are not arguments about what the law is; they are 
assertions about what our values should be. They are a battle for the descriptive high ground: for mastery 
over the terms of utterability.” Id. at 188–89 (emphasis omitted).  
8. See, e.g., Jack Jenkins, ‘Nones’ Now As Big as Evangelicals, Catholics in the US, RELIGION 
NEWS SERV. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://religionnews.com/2019/03/21/nones-now-as-big-as-evangelicals-
catholics-in-the-us/ [https://perma.cc/X5Q5-58B8] (“nones” now represent about 23.1 percent of the 
U.S. population).  
9. See, e.g., JOSEPH BOTTUM, AN ANXIOUS AGE: THE POST-PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE 
SPIRIT OF AMERICA (2014). 
10. See, e.g., EBOO PATEL, OUT OF MANY FAITHS: RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND THE AMERICAN 
PROMISE (2018); ASMA T. UDDIN, WHEN ISLAM IS NOT A RELIGION: INSIDE AMERICA’S FIGHT FOR 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2019). 
11. See, e.g., BILL BISHOP, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-MINDED AMERICA 
IS TEARING US APART (Mariner Books 2009) (2008); Richard Florida, America’s ‘Big Sort’ Is Only 
Getting Bigger, CITYLAB (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/the-big-sort-
revisited/504830/ [https://perma.cc/6ELF-2TLG]; Harry Enten, Ending Gerrymandering Won’t Fix 












election of Donald Trump to the White House have heightened tensions 
within and between various religious demographics.12 These and other 
changes reveal less consensus and greater tension within the American 
experiment of pluralism.13 
The doctrinal and cultural changes of the past few years suggest the time 
is right to assess the landscape of free exercise and establishment law: where 
it is and where it might be headed. To that end, Washington University in 
St. Louis assembled some of the nation’s leading law and religion scholars 
to reflect on these and other developments.14 
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION: CAMPUS RELIGIOUS GROUPS 
Michael McConnell’s keynote essay explores religious freedom for 
campus religious groups and the significance of the right of association.15 
Beginning with a historical review of the right of association and its 
antecedent, the right of assembly, McConnell argues that these protections 
have always allowed religious groups to limit membership to those who 
share the same values and beliefs. McConnell suggests that prior to the 
Court’s 2010 decision in Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, the 
government could enforce anti-discrimination laws only in the commercial 
sphere and in organizations whose membership restrictions were unrelated 
to their message or beliefs. But in Christian Legal Society, McConnell 
contends, the Court subsumed the freedom of association into free speech 
and held that the freedom of association only protected groups from 
government compulsion—not from the denial of benefits. McConnell 
asserts that this shift excludes the freedom of association from protections 
 
gerrymandering-wont-fix-what-ails-america/ [https://perma.cc/UK5U-4GX3]. But see Greg Martin & 
Steven Webster, The Real Culprit Behind Geographic Polarization, ATLANTIC (Nov. 26, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/11/why-are-americans-so-geographically-polarized/57 
5881/ [https://perma.cc/C38U-6Z62] (arguing that “[t]here is no intentional ‘big sort’”).  
12. See, e.g., JOHN FEA, BELIEVE ME: THE EVANGELICAL ROAD TO DONALD TRUMP (2018); 
THOMAS S. KIDD, WHO IS AN EVANGELICAL?: THE HISTORY OF A MOVEMENT IN CRISIS (2019); Mark 
Galli, Trump Should Be Removed from Office, CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.chris 
tianitytoday.com/ct/2019/december-web-only/trump-should-be-removed-from-office.html [https://per 
ma.cc/SL88-Y82Y]. 
13. See generally JOHN D. INAZU, CONFIDENT PLURALISM: SURVIVING AND THRIVING 
THROUGH DEEP DIFFERENCE (2016). 
14. The conference was cosponsored and facilitated by the Washington University School of 
Law, the John C. Danforth Center on Religion and Politics, and the Washington University Law Review 
(I hold a joint appointment between the first two entities). Special thanks for their work on the conference 
and this symposium to Rachel Mance at the law school; Sandy Jones, Sheri Peña, and Debra Kennard at 
the Danforth Center; and Ryan Lundquist, Kristina Gliklad, and Emma Stewart at the Law Review. The 
conference also benefited from excellent moderating by Elizabeth Katz, Chad Flanders, Anna Bialek, 
and Daniel Epps.  
15. Michael W. McConnell, Freedom of Association: Campus Religious Groups, 97 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 1641 (2020). McConnell is the Richard and Frances Mallery Professor and Director of the 
Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law School.  











afforded by the unconstitutional conditions doctrine. McConnell concludes 
by suggesting that the Court’s reasoning should trouble any and all who 
value civil liberties—especially if it “signals a general retreat” from 
protection of associational freedoms.16 
FIRST AMENDMENT TRADITIONALISM 
Marc DeGirolami’s contribution explores the role of traditionalism in 
religion clause jurisprudence.17 DeGirolami situates his argument with an 
overview of the “traditions” of First Amendment law: the use of practices 
characterized by both long age and endurance to serve as “presumptive 
constituents of textual meaning.”18 DeGirolami considers traditionalism’s 
interpretive role—offering past practices to understand unclear words—and 
its democratic role—resisting the abstractions of elites. As he compares 
traditionalism with various strains of originalism, DeGirolami contends that 
traditionalism offers something more than the “expected applications” that 
originalism offers jurists: enduring practices that give meaning to the text. 
And because traditionalism describes—and employs—real, enduring 
practices, DeGirolami suggests that it is the most real characterization of the 
“official story” of First Amendment law.19 DeGirolami concludes that—
despite academic protestations to the contrary—the Court uses 
traditionalism, not originalism, in deciding cases. 
RECONSIDERING THORNTON V. CALDOR 
Christopher Lund revisits the Court’s 1985 decision in Estate of 
Thornton v. Caldor20 and questions its internal logic and contemporary 
relevance.21 Lund opens with a review of the Caldor facts: a devout 
Presbyterian sued his employer for violating a Connecticut statute that gave 
employees the right not to work on their chosen Sabbath. Lund emphasizes 
the brevity and shallowness of the Court’s opinion: a single page of legal 
analysis that fails to consider free exercise—only offering an “almost-
visceral sense that the . . . statute advance[d] religion.”22 Analogizing to 
 
16. Id. at 1652. 
17. Marc O. DeGirolami, First Amendment Traditionalism, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1653 (2020). 
DeGirolami is the Cary Fields Professor of Law and Co-Director, Center for Law and Religion at St. 
John’s University School of Law.  
18. Id. at 1659. 
19. Id. at 1682. 
20. 472 U.S. 703 (1985). 
21. Christopher C. Lund, Reconsidering Thornton v. Caldor, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1687 (2020). 
Lund is a Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School. 












Lochner v. New York,23 Lund argues that the Court in both cases sought to 
protect “natural” market power from state interference: statutes protecting 
the physical health of employees in Lochner and statutes protecting the 
religious health of employees in Caldor. Lund observes that Caldor was the 
first time the Court found a religious exemption statute unconstitutional, and 
it did so with no attention to free exercise. Although Lund concludes that 
much in Caldor is “undoubtedly right,” the opinion’s lack of analysis means 
that “there are also reasons to treat the case warily and with caution.”24 
UNTANGLING ENTANGLEMENT 
Stephanie Barclay’s contribution is one of two articles that examine the 
effect of American Legion v. American Humanist Society on the Court’s 
standing doctrine.25 Barclay considers whether the longstanding test in 
Lemon v. Kurtzman26 remains viable after American Legion. She notes that 
six justices in American Legion expressed their desire to reject the Lemon 
test, either in whole or in part. Although she agrees that the first two prongs 
of the test can be justifiably discarded as ahistorical judicial inventions, she 
insists that the third prong—excessive entanglement—requires greater 
attention. Barclay contends that the Court’s pre-Lemon entanglement 
jurisprudence should survive in the two contexts in which it has historically 
been applied: protecting religious groups from government interference in 
their internal affairs and preventing the government from giving certain 
religious groups preferential treatment. Although the Court has also applied 
excessive entanglement tests elsewhere, Barclay argues that this use lacks 
the historical justifications supporting use in government interference and 
preferential treatment cases. Barclay concludes that the Court can resolve 
apparent tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and 
promote religious pluralism by restricting its entanglement analysis to only 
historical applications—thus permitting even-handed government 
partnerships with religious groups to remain. 
CROSSING DOCTRINES: CONFLATING STANDING AND THE MERITS UNDER 
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
Ashutosh Bhagwat’s contribution also examines the effect of American 
Legion v. American Humanist Society on the Court’s standing doctrine.27 
 
23. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  
24. Lund, supra note 21, at 1700. 
25. Stephanie H. Barclay, Untangling Entanglement, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1701 (2020). Barclay 
is Associate Professor of Law at Brigham Young University Law School. 
26. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).  
27. Ashutosh Bhagwat, Crossing Doctrines: Conflating Standing and the Merits Under the 











Bhagwat first assesses Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence which argues that 
“offended observer” standing should be abandoned because it derives from 
Lemon v. Kurtzman and a majority of the Court has now abandoned Lemon. 
While agreeing both that “offended observer” standing ought to be 
discarded and that its existence is unique to Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, Bhagwat disagrees that Lemon is the source of this theory of 
standing. Instead, he notes that the endorsement prong of the Lemon test—
from which “offended observer” standing is supposedly derived—first 
appeared in a 1984 concurrence and was not adopted by a majority until 
1989, by which point lower courts had already recognized a version of such 
standing. Bhagwat further suggests that an Establishment Clause violation 
alone does not give rise to a judicially cognizable injury: mere offense or 
feelings of exclusion must be paired with a more traditional legal claim, 
with the Establishment Clause providing substantive law to adjudicate that 
claim. Although eliminating offended observer standing would complicate 
standing in religious display cases, Bhagwat contends that plaintiffs in cases 
involving schools or legislative prayer would likely retain standing because 
of those environments’ coercive natures. Bhagwat concludes that his 
arguments would likewise question Equal Protection standing, where injury 
is merely the inability to compete equally, not tangible consequences. 
WHAT IS A “SUBSTANTIAL BURDEN” ON RELIGION UNDER RFRA AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT? 
Gabrielle Girgis looks at the meaning of “substantial burden” under free 
exercise analysis.28 Girgis assesses what constitutes a “substantial burden” 
in claims under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and the 
Free Exercise Clause. She surveys three current tests—one used in lower 
courts and two proposed by legal scholars—for identifying substantial 
burdens and, after noting their strengths and weaknesses, expands to create 
 
Establishment Clause, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1729 (2020). Bhagwat is the Boochever and Bird Endowed 
Chair for the Study and Teaching of Freedom and Equality and Martin Luther King Jr. Professor at 
University of California, Davis School of Law. Bhagwat’s article addresses an issue argued on different 
sides of the American Legion appeal by two of the other symposium contributors. See Michael W. 
McConnell, Brief Amicus Curiae of The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty in Support of Petitioners, 
Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (2019) (No. 17-1717), 2018 WL 6819439 (arguing 
that respondents lacked standing because offended-observer standing is an anomaly and standing under 
the Establishment Clause requires a concrete, personal injury), and Christopher C. Lund, Brief of Law 
Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Am. Legion, 139 S. Ct. 2067 (No. 17-1717), 
2019 WL 582080 (suggesting that the arguments against standing were unpersuasive, would work a sea 
change in Establishment Clause claims, and conflated the merits with standing). 
28. Gabrielle M. Girgis, What Is a “Substantial Burden” on Religion Under RFRA and the First 
Amendment?, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1755 (2020). Girgis is a graduate student in the Department of 












a new framework for courts to use. Her framework identifies two categories 
of religious exercise that can be substantially burdened: religious 
obligations and the exercise of “religious autonomy.” Girgis then describes 
four types of cognizable burdens, of which the first three require the 
claimant to choose between two or more undesirable options: to forego 
religious exercise, to exercise and forego public benefit, to exercise and 
suffer a legal penalty, or to be prevented from exercising at all. Girgis argues 
that only laws that affect the two categories of religious exercise and that 
create one or more of the four kinds of cognizable burdens can be said to 
create a substantial burden. Defending against potential Establishment 
Clause concerns, Girgis argues that her framework’s breadth will prevent 
courts from discriminating between religions and will require courts to defer 
to the claimant on “whether [the] practice is truly an obligation or a form of 
substantial religious autonomy”—thus preventing courts from endorsing 
certain doctrinal interpretations.29 Girgis concludes by applying her 
framework to RFRA claims and Smith, showing that it would find a 
substantial burden in cases like Hobby Lobby but not in cases where there 
is only a conscience-based and not a religion-based objection. 
‘THE PECULIAR GENIUS OF PRIVATE-LAW SYSTEMS’: MAKING ROOM FOR 
RELIGIOUS COMMERCE 
Michael Helfand argues that the use of private law agreements to buoy 
so-called religious commerce is slowly being eroded by public law.30 By 
relying on “neutral principles of law” in lieu of theological language in 
contracts, Helfand asserts, religious institutions, individuals, and 
corporations have long been able to avoid the public law “religious 
question” doctrine. Helfand contends that this norm has allowed religious 
commercial transactions like the kosher food industry, church and 
synagogue land trusts and grants, and religious arbitration agreements to 
flourish. Helfand expresses concern that this norm is being attacked by 
modern scholars who argue that religious arbitration agreements violate the 
Federal Arbitration Act’s neutrality principles and that granting binding 
legal decision-making authority to religious arbitrators violates the 
Establishment Clause. Helfand concludes that although public law serves 
an important fringe function—preventing courts from making exclusively 
religious determinations or expressing a sectarian preference—public law 
 
29. Id. at 1781. 
30. Michael A. Helfand, ‘The Peculiar Genius of Private-Law Systems’: Making Room for 
Religious Commerce, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1787 (2020). Helfand is the Associate Dean for Faculty and 
Research and a Professor of Law at Pepperdine University’s Caruso School of Law.  











incursions into private law norms undermine an important economic 
microsystem: religious commerce. 
RECONSIDERING HOSTILE TAKEOVER OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS 
Jessie Hill concludes the symposium by returning our attention to a key 
focus of McConnell’s essay: Christian Legal Society v. Martinez.31 Hill 
explores the issue of disagreement within religious institutions and the 
“hostile takeover” threat posited in Justice Alito’s dissent. After reviewing 
various hostile takeover cases, Hill determines that the heart of the issue is 
whether it is appropriate for a group to prevent changes in its values or 
mission by excluding outsiders who both want to join and then to alter the 
group through the group’s normal procedural means. Hill notes that in the 
associational context, hostile takeovers are often organizational changes 
made through legitimate means, therefore making it difficult to discern why 
such changes should be found inappropriate by the courts. Thus, rather than 
creating a new hostile takeover jurisprudence, Hill argues that the 
independence of religious organizations is best preserved by relying on 
well-established religion clause doctrine that prevents secular interference 
in faith-based matters.  
***** 
Justice Alito’s opinion in American Legion observed that when it comes 
to the Court’s Establishment Clause doctrine, “[w]hile the concept of a 
formally established church is straightforward, pinning down the meaning 
of a ‘law respecting an establishment of religion’ has proved to be a vexing 
problem.”32 The same could be said of free exercise doctrine. Even with the 
relatively straightforward standard in Smith, courts and scholars have 
struggled to articulate the scope and meaning of free exercise and even of 
“religion” itself.33 The increasing religious heterogeneity in American 
society suggests that these challenges will continue. Indeed, they are in 
some ways interminable—some doctrinal issues unavoidably raise 
simultaneous concerns of free exercise and establishment, and some 
theoretical tensions are inevitably zero-sum. Nevertheless, the scholarly 
 
31. B. Jessie Hill, Reconsidering Hostile Takeover of Religious Organizations, 97 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1833 (2020). Hill is the Judge Ben C. Green Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research 
and Faculty Development at Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
32. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 (2019) (Alito, J., plurality 
opinion).  
33. See, e.g., George C. Freeman, III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of 
“Religion,” 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983); Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional 
Law, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 753 (1984); Jonathan P. Kuhn, Note, The Religious Difference: Equal 












task remains to clarify and sharpen emerging doctrine, elucidate tensions, 
and minimize ambiguities. The contributors to this volume join that ongoing 
work at this important moment in religion clause doctrine. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
